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Vor... XVII. DECEMBER, 1918 
DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF DEEDS 
No. 2. 
I T is proposed, in the first part of this paper, to consider the nature of the delivery of a deed, more particularly a deed of convey-
ance, and the facts and circumstances which the courts have 
rc;,aarded as justifying an inference of delivery. The second part of 
the paper will be devoted to a consideration of the necessity of the 
acceptance of a deed, in addition to delivery, in order that it may 
have a legal operation. 
DELIVERY 
A written instrument, regarded as a constitutive or dispositive 
act, becomes legally operative by reason either (r) of the mutual 
action of two or more persons, parties in interest thereto, or ( 2) of 
the action of one person, from whom the writing may be regarded as 
issuing. The mutual action of two or more persons is required in 
the case of what are known as simple contracts, while all other in-
struments, by the theory of the English common law,1 become lc;,aally 
operative by the action of one party only. Of such other instru-
ments, some are said to take effect by delivery, this tenn serving to 
designate the final act by which one who has previously signed the 
instrument, or both signed and sealed it, signifies his intention that 
the instrument shall have a legal operation, and so realizes his inten-· 
tion in fact. Conveyances of land, including leases, contracts under 
seal, mortgages of land and of chattels, deeds of gift, insurance 
policies, and promissory notes, take effect by delivery. Of the 
instruments which, while becoming operative by the action of one 
person alone, are not said to take effect by delivery, the most impor-
tant class, perhaps the only class, consists of testamentary instru-
ments, wills. But though, in the case of a will. there is no require-
ment of delivery under that name, nevertheless an instrument or-
dinarily becomes operative as a will only by virtue of a final express-
2 See post at note 83. 
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ion of intention by the maker to that effect, such expression usually 
taking the form, by force of statute, of a declaration in the presence 
of witnesses of an intention that the instrument shall be legally 
operative, or of a request addressed to witnesses to attest the signa-
ture thereto, provided they accede to the request. Such final expres-
sion of intention in the case of a will is the equivalent of the final ex-
pression of intention by means of delivery in the case of an instru-
ment inter vivos. 
The expression "delivery," as applied to a written instrument, had 
its inception, it appears,2 in connection with written conveyances of 
lands, the manual transfer or "delivery" of which was, in early 
times, upon parts of the continent of Europe, regarded as in effect a 
symbolical transfer of the land itself, analagous to livery of seisin. 
And not only was the notion of physical delivery of the instrument 
applied in connection with the transfer of land, but it was applied al-
so in connection with written evidences of contract. the physical 
tia.nsfer of the document being necessary to make it legally operative, 
and being effective to that end.3 The view that a transfer of land 
could be effected by means. of the manual transfer of a writing was 
originally adopted in ~ngland to but a limited extent, but in so far as 
the courts recognized the effectiveness of a written instrument for 
the purpose of transfer or of contract, they adopted the continental 
conception of a physical change of possession thereof as a prerequi-
site to its legal operation, and accordingly the necessity ~f delivery 
became established in connection with various classes of written in:-
struments as they came to be recognized by the courts, particularly 
deeds of grant, contracts under ·seal, the only class of contract rec-
ognized in the earlier hist9ry of our law, and promissory notes.• 
\Vhile, as before stated, the necessity of delivery in connection 
with the instruments last named, and other5 of an analagous charac-
ter, is still fully recognized, the crude conception of a manual trans-
fer of the instrument as the only means of making it legally effective, 
which gave birth to the expression "delivery" as used in this connec-
tion, has been superseded by the more enlightened view that whether 
an instrument has been delivered is a question of intention merely, 
there being a sufficient delivery if an intention appears that is shall be 
legally operative, 5 however this intention may be indicated. 6 Ac-
: Brissaud, Freneh Private Law, (Continental Legal History- Serles} §§ -"!IS. 3D2- 3•3-
z Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 85, 86. 
2 Brissaud, op. cit. § 370. :z Pollock & Maitland, 190. 
4 .As to promissory notes, see article by Professor W. S. Holdsworth. "'The Ea:rly 
History of Negotiable Instruments", 3x Law Quart. Rev. al: p. 17. 
5 Fit.::patricll v. Brigman, 130 Ala. 450; R.usen v. Mey# 77 Ark. 89; FoII:llU!T v. Iuilo-
rer, 158 Cal. 755; BOfIJers v. CottreU (Idaho}, 96 Pac. 936; Riegd v. Riegel, 243 m 6:z6; 
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cordingly, it is generally ~crreed that delivery does not necessarily 
involve any manual transfer of the instrument ;7 and provided an in-
tention is indicated that the deed shall talce effect, the fact that the 
grantor retains possession of the instrumc-nt is immaterial.8 So, 
while it is frequently said, both by the ol<ler and later authorities, 
that delivery may be made to a third pt•rson for the benefit of the 
grantee,9 meaning thereby that_ the convt·yance may take effect by 
Burkholder v. Casad, 47 Ind. 418; Sheldon v. Crane (Iowa), 125 N. \V. 238; Doty v. 
Barker (Kan.), 97 Pac. 964; B11rk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 4,14; Ingersoll v. Odendchl, 136 
Minn. 428; 162 N. \V. 525; Coulson v. Coulson, 180 Mo. 709; Marlin v. Flaherty, 13 
Mont. 96; 32 Pac. 187; 19 L. R. A. 242; 40 Am. St. Rep. 415; Flannery v. Flannery, 
99 Neb. 557; 156 N. W. 1065; Vruland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 56; Fisher v. Hall, 41 . 
N. Y. 416; Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144; 88 S. E. 217; Mitchell's Lessee v. Rya11, 3 
Ohio St. 377; Johns<:n v. Craig (Okla.), 130 Pac. 581; Sapping/ield v. King (Oreg.), 8 
L. R. A., N. S. 106; Hannah v. Swarnet, 8 Watts (Pa.), u: McCartney v. McCartney, 
93 Tc.'<. 359; J.fatson v. Johnson (Wash.), 93 Pac, 324; Glade Coal Min, Co. V• Harris 
(W. Va.), 63 S. E. 873. In Co~ v. Schnerr (Cal.), 156 Pac. 509, it is in effect said 
that though the granter intends, in handing the instrument to the grantor, to make It 
operative as a conveyance, there is no delivery if it is procured by fraud. This is, it is 
submitted, erroneous. The intention exists, and hence there is a delivery, though the 
intention is based on a misconception wrongfully induced. There are almost number· 
less decisions recognizing that the legal title passes in such case. 
•Delivery, being a question of intention, is one of fact, for the jury. Murray 
v. Stair, 2 Barn & C. 82; Fitzpatrick v. Brigma1J, 133 Ala. 242; Do11ah11e v. Sweney (Cal.), 
153 Pac. 708; Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154; Braun v. Monroe, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 
324; Bishop v. Burke, 207 Mass. 133: O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 130 Minn. 292; 153 N. W. 
607; Hurlburt v. Wheeler, 40 N. H. 73; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Crain v. 
Wrighr, 36 Hun 74; n4 N. Y. 307; Archambeau v. Edms.nson (Ore.), 171 Pac. 186; 
Fisher v. Kean, l \Vatts (Pa.) 278; McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359; Dwinell v. 
Bliss, 58 Vt. 353; Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer (Wash.), 93 Pac. 265; Garrett v. Goj/ 
(W. Va.), 56 S. E. 351; Kittoe V· Willey, 121 Wis. 548 • 
.. Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cranshaw (Ala.), 53 So. 812; Faulknu v. Feazel (Ark.), 
168 S. \V. 568; Smith v. J.!ay, 3 Penn. (Del.) 233; 50 At. 59; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 
Ill. 284; 40 Am. Rep. 592; Prince v. Prince, 258 llL 304; lol N. E. 6u8; Fitzgerald v. 
Go/I, 99 Ind. 28; Nc-JJton \'. Bealer, 41 Iowa 334; Pentico v. Hays (Kan.), SS Pac. 738; 
Kirby v. H.,lette, 174 Ky. 257; 192 S. W. 63; 9 L. R. A.; Byers v. McClenahan. 6 Gill 
& ]. ;150; Creeden V· Mahoney, 193 Mass. 402; Thatcher v. St. Andrews Ch .. rch, 37 
Mich. 264; Chastek v. So11ba, 93 Minn. 418; Yo1111g v. Elgi" (Miss.), 27 So. 595; Lee v. 
Parker, 171 N. C. 144; 8 S. E. 217: Dukes v. Stang?er, 35 Ohio St. 119; Farrar Y. 
Bridges, 5 Humph, (Tenn.), 4n; Matson v. Johnson (Wash.), 93 Pac. 324. 
a Doe d. Gamons v. Knight, 5 Barn & C. 671; Xenos v. Wickliam, L. R. 2 H. L. 
296; Austin v. Fendall, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 362; Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622, 40 Am. 
Rep. 617; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109; 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; Bunnell v. Bitnnell, tI r 
Ky. 566; J.foorc v. Ha:elton, 9 AIIcn (Mass.) 102; Stevens v. Hatch, 6 Minn. 64; Wall 
v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; 64 Am. Dec. 147: Ruckman v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 259; 
Scnigham v. Wood, 15 \Vend (N. Y.) 545; 30 Am. Dec. 75; Mitchell's I.essee v. R::l'an, 
3 Ohio St. 377; Ledgerwood v. Gault, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 643; Thatcher v. Capcca, 75 \Vash. 
249; 134 Pac. 923. 
·so the fact that the grantor stiII bas access to the instrument does not conclusiTely 
negative delivery. Strickland v. Griswold (Ala.), 43 So. 105; Cribbs v. Walk<r, 74 Ark. 
104; Kenni/f v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34; .lluuro v. Bowles, 187 Ill. 346; 54 L. R. A. 864; 
Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 544; Payne v._ Hallgarlh, 33 Ore. 430; Wilson v. Wilsor. 
(Utah), 89 Pac. 643. 
9 Shcpp:1:rd's Touchstone, 57; 4 Kent's Comm. 455; Do' d. Garnons v. Knight, 5 
Barn & C. 671; X'nos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312; Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cran-
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reason of physical transfer of the instrument to a third person, this 
would seem to result, not from any particular virtue in the transfer, 
but from the fact that the transfer may show an intention to make 
the instrument legally operative. A declaration to such third person 
of an intention that the deed shall take effect would seem to be quite 
as effective as a manual transfer to him, if satisfactorily proven,1" 
and would indeed, as affording indubitable evidence of the grantor's 
intention, have a conclusiveness that may be lacking in the case of 
a mere manual transfer. Such a transfer to a third person, if not 
made with the intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, 
does not constitute a delivery ;u nor does such a transfer to the 
grantee himself, if the transfer is not with such intention, but is for 
shau! (Ala.), S3 So. 8I2; Walson v. Hill (Ark.), 186 S. W. 68; Crozer v. White (Cal.), 
100 Pac. r30: Clark v. Clark, 183 Ill. 448, 75 Am. St. Rep. n5; Gornel v. McDaniels, 
269 Ill. 362, 109 N. E. 996; Malheson v. Ma:lieson, 13;1 I0cwa.5n, 18 L. R. A., N. S. 
n67; Hannon ,._ Bower (Kan.), 96 Pac. 51; Beatty v. Beatty, 151 lCy. 547; 1s2 S. W. 
s40; Clark v. Cruviell, n2 Md. 339; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mttc. (Mass.) 412; Cooper 
v. Cooper (Mich.), i27 N. W. 266; Barl<lJrd v. Thurston, 86 :Minn. 343; Sneathen T. 
Sneathen, IO~ Mo. 20I; 24 .Am.. St. Rep. 326; Iones v. S:ra;y::e, 42 N. J. Law 279; 
Church v. Gilman, IS Wend. 656; Robbi'IS v. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79; 38 L. R. A. 238; 
s8 Am. St. Rep.; :Meeks v. Stillwell, 54 Ohio St. 541; Belcl1cr v. La Gra11de Nat. Bk. 
(Ore.), l7I Pac. 4Io; Eckman v. Eckman, SS Pa. 269; Kanner v. SJart:: (Tex. Civ.), 203 
s. w. 6o3. 
Statements, occasionally found, to the effect that the instrument must he handed to 
the third person with the intentipn that he pass it on, so to speak, to the grantee named, 
(See e. g. Osborne v. Eslinger, 155 Ind. 35I) or that he must pass it on (Furcncs v. 
Eid~, I09 Iowa su; Jaskson v. Phipps, 12 Johns (N. Y.) 418), are, it is conceived, abso-
lutely incorrect. The intention of the granter as to whether the instrument shall take 
effect as a conveyance is the subject for ascertainment, not his intention, if he happens 
to have any, as to the ultimate custody of the writing. 
In one state it appears to ·have been decided that a manuel transfer to a third person 
can not involve delivery unless such person is a dnly authorized agent of the granter. 
Jameson v. Goodwin, (Okla.), 170 Pac. 241. Such a view appears to he entirely out of 
harmony with the authorities in other jurisdictions. 
'° 3 Preston, Abstracts, 63; Doc d. Gamons v. KnigTit, 5 Barn & C. 671; Xenos v. 
Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312; Linton v. Brown's Admr.s.. (C. C.) 20 Fed. 455; Rushin v. 
Shields. n Ga. 636; 56 Am. Dec. 436; :Moore v: HaEelton, 9 Allen (Mass.), 102; Regan v. 
Howe, I2I Mass. 424; Kane v. Mackin, 9 Smedes & M. (Mass.) 387; Vought's Errs v. 
Vought, 50 N. J. Eq. 177; Scrugham v. Wood, 25 Wend (N. Y.) 545; Diehl v. Emig, 
• 65 Pa. St. 320; Contra: Moore v. Collins, 15 N. C. 384-
u Co. Litt. 36a; Sheppard's Touch.ctone, 57; Culver v. Carroll (Ala.), !7 So. 767; 
Baker v. Bako?r (Cal), 100 Pac. 892; Merrills v. Swift, IS Conn. 257; P.Jrter v. H'ood-
house, 59 Conn. 568; 22 At. 299; 13 L. R. A. 64; 21 Am. St. Rep. 131; Lange v. Culli 
nan, 205 Ill. 365; Connor v • .Buhl, ns Mich. 531; Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316~ 
Jackson v. Phipps, I2 Johns (N. Y.) 418; Mitchell's Lessee v. R:ran, 3 Ohio St. 377; 
Sears v. Scr:<nton Trust Co., 228 Pa. 226; Leftwich v. Early (Va.). 79 S. E. 384; 
Showalter v. Spangler (Wash.), 160 P.ac. 1042-
A statement by the granter of an intention that the conveyance shall be immediately 
operative has been regarded as dfcctive as a delivery, although the instrument had been 
pre\"iously placed hy him in another's custody to hold in his, the grantor's, behalf. :Moore 
v. Trott (Cal.), I22 Pac. 642; Elliott v. Hof!hine, 97 X2n. 26, 154 Pac. 225. 
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another purpose as, for instance, to enable him to examine the in4 
strument.12 
In spite however of these numerous decisions recognizing the 
minor importance of the matter of actual transfer of the instrument 
in connection with the question of delivery, the courts not infre-
quently speak as if such transfer were an essential in delivery. The 
occasional references, moreover, to delivery "to" the grantee, sug-
gest the idea of a physical transfer to him. The delivery of a con-
veyance or other instrument involves in its essence no delivery "to,, 
any one, since it means merely the expression, by word or act, of an 
intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, and the fact 
that ·in many cases such intention is indicated by the making of a 
physical transfer does not show that such transfer is necessary. 
The partial survival of the primitive formalism, as it has been well 
termed,13 which attached some peculiar efficacy to the physical trans-
.fer of the instrument, as involving a symbolical transfer of the prop-
erty described therein, is presumably to be attributed to the· fact 
that in other connections the words "deliver,, and "delivery,'' as ap-
plied to inanimate things, ordinarily have reference to a physical 
transfer. 
It being conceded that even a voluntary transfer of the instrument 
by the grantor to the grantee does not involve a delivery if not with 
the intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, i~ neces-
sarily follows that the instrument cannot be regarded as having been 
delivered merely because the grantee has acquired possession thereof 
without the grantor's consent.u And it has been decided that the 
fact of non delivery in such case may be asserted even as against a 
subsequent bona fide purchaser, who purchased in reliance on the 
grantee's possession of the instrument.15 There are however dicta to 
the effect that the grantor may, by reason of his lack of care in the 
"Bray v. Bray (Ark.), 201 S. \V. 281; Knincy v. Parks, 137 Cal. 527; Osruald v. 
Caldwell, 225 Ill. 224; Kavanaugh v. Kat'anaugh, 260 Ill. 179, 103 N. E. 65; Witt v. 
Witt (Iowa), 156 N. W. 321; Ball v. Sandlin, 176 Ky. 537, 195 S. W. 1089; Tewksbury 
v. Teu-hbury, 222 Mass. 595, 111 N. E. 394; Comer v. Baldwin, 16 Minn. 172; Braman 
v. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 483; Ga:y/ord v Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222; Clark v. Clark, 56 Ore. 
218, 107 Pac. 23; In re Nicholls, 190 Pa. 308; Gordon v. White, (S. D.), 145 N. \V. 
439; Dtci,.ell v. Bliss, 58 Vt. 353; Zoerb v. Paet&, 137 Wis. 59. 
u 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2405 • 
. IABn.cler v. Barton (Ala.), 52 So. 26; Bowers v. Cottrell (Idaho), 96 Pac. 936; 
Lu .. dy v. Mason, 174 Ill. 505; Schaefer v. Purviance, 160 Ind. 63; !lint:: v. Hint~ 
(Iowa), 156 N. \V. 878; White v. Holder (Ky.), u8 S. W. 995; Westlake \"• Dunn, 
184 Mass. 260, lOO Am. St. Rep. 557; Gardiner v. Gardiner (Mich.), 95 N. W. 973; 
Aile,. v. Ayer, 26 Ore. 589; King v. Diffey (Tc.'<. Civ.), 192 S. W. 262. 
""~ould v. Wise, 97 Cal.· 532; Henry v. Carson, 95 Ind. 412; OgJ,.,. v. Ogden, 4 
Ohio St. 458; B11rns v. Keimedy (Ore.), 90 Pac. 1102; Van Amringc v. llforton, 4 
\Vhart (Pa.) 382. 
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custody of the instrument, be estopped, in favor of a bona fide pur-
chaser, to deny its delivery.16 
Apart from any question of bona fide purchase, there are a number 
of de~isions to the effect that an instrument of conveyance, the pos-
session of which has been improperly acquired by the grantee named 
therein, may be subsequently made operative by the grantor's rec-
ognition of the title as being in such grantee.17 In connection with 
these decisions the courts ordinarily speak of such recognition as 
involving a "ratification" of the deed or of the delivery, but·what ac-
tually occurs is, it is conceived, a delivery by the grantor, that is, 
an expression of an intention by him, not previously expressed, that 
the instrument, which has already passed into the grantee's hands, 
shall take effect as a transfer of title. An· instrument which is in-
operative as a conveyance for lack of legal delivery cannot be made 
operative by ratification, there being indeed, in such case, nothing to 
ratify. And likewise a physical transfer of the instrument, which 
lacks all legal significance because not made by one authorized to 
make delivery, cannot thereafter, by ratification, be transformed into 
a legal delivery, that is, an expression of intention that the instru-
ment shall be legally operative. 
The delivery of an instrument is a part of the execution thereof,18 
and in so far as a written or sealed authority may be necessary to 
enable one to sign or seal an instrument as an agent acting in behalf 
of the grantor, such an authority is, it is conceived, necessary to 
enable one to deliver the instrument as such agent.19 It would be 
strange if the final expression of intention, which makes the instru-
ment legally operative,. could be given by one acting under an oral 
authority, while the merely preliminary acts of signing anQ. sealing 
can be performed by an agent only when acting under autliority in 
1
• Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532; Allen v. Ayer, 26 Ore. 589; ll!erck v.-Merck, 83 S. C. 
329; Garner v. Risinger (Tex. Civ.), 81 S. \V. 343; Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 \Vis. 55, 
n Am. Rep. 546; Laughlin v. Calumet & CMcago Canal & Dock Co., 65 Fed. 44x, x3 
C. C. A. 1. 
11 Whitney v. Dewey, xo Idaho 633; Phelps v. Pratt, 225 Ill. 85; Harkness v. Cleauu, 
113 Iowa 140; McNult:y v. McNulty, 47 Kan. 208; Pannell v. AsketD (Tex. Civ. App.), 
143 s. w. 364. 
18 See Goodlett v. Goodman Coal & Coke Co., 192 Fed. 775, II3 C. C. A. 61; Clark 
v. Child, 66 Cal. 87, 4 Pac. xo58; Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 Pac. 936; Colee 
v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; McAndrett1 v. Sewell, too Kan. 47, 163 
l'ac. 653; Tucker v. Helgie1,1, 102 Minn. 382, n3 N. \V. 912; and other cases cited in 
"Words & Phrases" under "Execute." 
10 That an agent cannot deliver ~ deed without authority under seal is explicitly 
decided in Hibble-JJhite v. J.f'Morine, 6 Mees &.W. 200; Powell v. London & P:rcn:incial 
Ba"k (1893), 2 Ch. 555. 
So it is said in Sheppard's Touchstone at p. 57, that "where one pexson dclivexs an 
instn1ment as the act of anothe> pexson, who is present, no deed conferring an authority 
is requisite. But a person cannot, unless authorized by deed, exccntc an instru=t." 
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writing. There are however to be found occasional judicial ~tate­
ments that a deed may be delivered by one acting under oral author- . 
ity,z' and that this may be done is not infrequently assumed by the 
courts.:11 That an oral authority is sufficient for this purpose ap-
pears to be involved in the decisions, rendered in a number of 
states,22 that a conveyance which, at the time it leaves the hands of 
the grantor, lacks the name of a grantee, becomes valid if the name 
is subsequently inserted by an agent acting under oral authority 
from the grantor, th~e decisions apparently involving the assump-
tion that the delivery of the deed is made by such agent, since deliv-
ery could_not be made so long_~~ _!4.e instrument, Tu.eking the name 
of the grantee, was a legal nullity, and there is no act by the grantor, 
after the insertion of such name, which can be referred to as indica-
tive of an intention to deliver. 
The view indicated in the decisions ref erred to, that an agent act-
ing under oral authority may make delivery, is presumably based on 
the misconception, previously referred to, that delivery of a deed 
means merely the manuaf transfer of the instrument. That an agent 
in possession of the instrument in behalf of the grantor is in a posi-
tion to hand it to the grantee, whether his agency is based on a writ-
ten or an oral authority, is sufficiently obvious, and because he is in 
a position to do this it is assumed that he has the power and authori-
ty to make delivery of the instrument on behalf of the grantor. 
But delivery of the instrument involves more than a manual trans-
fer thereof, and the fact that the agent is in a position to make 
such a transfer is no reason for assuming that he has legal author-
ity to express, by word or act, an intention on the part of the grant-
or that the instrument shall become legally operative. It no doubt 
frequently occurs that the grantor hands the completed instrument 
to an agent, with oral instructions to hand it to the grantee upon 
some subsequent event, .ordinarily the payment of the purchase mon-
"'White v. ·Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Macurda' v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 
341, II4 N. E. 366; Laf!ert~· v. Lafferty, .µ W. Va. 783; See Huffcut, Agency (2nd ed.), 
p. 38. . 
=sturtewnt v. Sturtevant, n6 Ill. 340; Furenes v. Eide, IO!) Iowa sn; Conwa.v v. 
Roel:, 139 Iowa 162; Sar.taquin Min. Co. v. High Roller Min. Co., 25 Utah 282; Spring 
Garden Bank V· Hulings Lumber Cu., 32 W. Va., 357, 3 L. R. A. 583. 
=Hall v. Kary, 133 Iowa 465, no N. W. 930, II9 Am. St. Rep. 639; Guthrie v. 
Field, 85 Kan. 58, n6 Pac. 217, 37 L. R. A., N. S. 326; Inhabitants of South Berwick 
v. Huntress, 53 Mc. 90; Board of Education of Minneapolis v. Hughes, n8 Minn. 404, 
136 N. W. 1095, 41 L. R. A., N. S. 637; Th11mmel v. Holden, 169 Mo. 677; Montgomery 
v. Dre.r'lur, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N. W. 251, 38 L. R. A., N. S. 423; Hemmenwa.y v. Mu· 
lock, 56 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 38; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore. 2u, 28 .Am. St. Rep. 746; 
LIJ1fSOr v. Simpson, 1 Rich Eq. (S. C.) 71, 42 Am. Dec. 345; Threadgill v. Butler, 60 
Tex. 599; Clemmons v. McGeer (Wash.), ns Pac. 1081; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 
783; Friend v. Yahr, 126 Wis. 291, I L. R. A., N. S. 891, no Am. St. Rep. 924. 
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ey. In such case, however, the delivery, it is conceived, is properly 
to be regarded as a conditional delivery made by the grantor him-
self, a deliver}' made by him, that is, at the time of handing the 
instrument to his agent, conditioned however upon the subsequent 
payment of the purchase money or occurrence of the other event 
named, on which the agent was to hand the instrument to the gran-
tee. Upon the satisfaction of the condition the delivery by the 
grantor becomes effective, as in the case of any other conditional de-
livery ,23 and the mere act of the agent in handing the instrument to 
the grantee is not, technically speaking, a delivery thereof, it having 
already been delivered. 
Since the delivery must be made by the grantor, or by the grant-
or's agent, in order to be effective, there can be no delivery after the 
grantor's death. A deceased grantor can obviously not make de-
livery, and the agent's authority necessarily comes to an end upon 
the death of the principal.24 
It is not infrequently said that there is no delivery if the grantor 
still retains control or dominion over the deed.25 Such a statement 
is somewhat ambiguous. The mere fact that the grantor retains 
possession of the instrument is, as above indicated,26 . not incom-
patible with delivery, and yet it can hardly be said that, having pos-
session of the deed, he has no dominion or control thereover. The 
statement may mean that the fact that the grantor has a right to 
demand the physical possession of the instrument, or to refuse to 
relinquish such possession, conclusively shows that the instrument 
has not been delivered since, after delivery, the grantee, and not the 
grantor, is· entitled to control the possession. of the instrument, it 
being his muniment of title: Or it may mean that the fact that the 
grantor has a right to determine whether the instrument shall have 
23 See an article by the present writer on "Conditional Delivery of Deeds", 14 Co-
lumbia Law Rev. 389. 
"'Mortgage· Trust Co. v. Moore, 150 Ind. 465; Sclsae/er v. Anchor Mutual Fire 
Insur. Co., n3 Iowa 652; Colyer v. Hayden, 94 Ky. 180; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 
60 Am. Rep. 291; Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 395; Meikle v. Cloquet (\VaslL), 87 Pac. 841. 
""Sec c. g. Tarwater v. Going, 140 Ala. 273; Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 ConIL 568, 
21 Am. St. Rep. 131, 13 L. R. A. 64; Rutledge v. Montgomery, 30 Ga. 899; Callerand 
v. Piot, 241 Ill. 120; Pethel v. Pet1'el (Ind. App.), 90 N. E. 102; Kirby v. Hulette, 
174 Ky. 257, 192 S. W. 63; Renehan v. l>fcAvoy (Md.), 81 At. 586; Joslin v. Goddard, 
187 Mass. 165; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 285; Ingersoll v. Odendahl, 236 M"mn. .;28, 162 
N. W. 525; Hall v. Waddill, 78 ]\fiss. 16; Peters v. Berkmcier, 184 Mo. 393; Baker v. 
Haskell, 47 N. H. 479, 93 Am. Dec. 455; Fisher v. Hall, .;1 N. Y. 416; Gayford v· Ga,~ 
lord, 150 N:. C. 222; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258; Ball v. 
Foremari, 37 Ohio St. 139; Eckman v. Eckman, SS Pa. St. 269; Johnson v. Johnson, 24 
R. I. 571; M.•rck v. Merck, 83 S. C.· 329; Cassidy v. Holland (S. D.), 130 N. \V. 777; 
Gaines v. Keener, 48 W. Va. 56; B .. tts v. Rit:1'ards, 152 Wis. 318, %40 N. W. 7. 
"° Ante note 8. 
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a legal operation shows that it has not been delivered, since after 
delivery he has no such right. But since the question whether the_ 
grantor has the right of control as regards either possession of ·the · 
instrument or its legal operation depends on whether there has been 
a delivery, the statement refen:ed to amounts to little more than a 
statement that, so long as the instrument is subject to the grantor's 
control by reason of lack of delivery, the instrument has not been 
delivered. The statement is unquestionably correct, but appears to 
be of questionable utility, and its frequent repetition is calculated to 
obscure, rather than to clarify, the nature of delivery. 
In connection with the question of the delivery of a deed, various 
rules of presumption have been judicially asserted, that is, particu-
lar states of fact have been regarded as showing prima f acic, that 
the instrument has or has not been delivered. 
It has been said that the fact that the instrument remains in the 
possession of the ·grantor raises a presumption that it has not been 
delivered.:rr This appears to be merely another·way of saying that 
delivery is an affirmative :fact, the burden of proving which is upon 
the person alleging it. If he cannot support this burden by evidence 
of a change of possession of the instrument, he must support it by 
other evidence. 28 
While a presumption of non delivery is said ordinarily to arise 
from the grantor's possession of the instrument, no such presump-
tion arises, it is said, if the grantor, by the terms of the instrument, 
reserves a life estate in the property, for the reason that there is no 
object in such a reservation unless the instrument is to operate be-
fore the grantor's death.29 That such a reservation shows that the 
instrument was prepared with the intention that its operation should 
not be postponed till the grantor's death may be conceded, but it is 
difficult to see what bearing this has on the question of delivery, 
since the form of the instrument, even without the reservation, 
shows that it was prepared with this intention. It might as well be 
said that any instrument in the form of a conveyance inter vivos as 
distinguished from a will, though still in the possession of the grant-
"'Donahue v. Smeeny (Cd.),. 153 Pac. 708; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 260 Ill. 179, 
103 N. E. 65; Slsdler v. Srt:f11Grt, 133 Iowa 320; Dunbar v. Meadows, 16; ·Ky. 275, 176 
S. W. 1167; I;Judles v. Nickerson (Me.), 78 At. 100: Cassid3 v. Holland (S. D.), 130 
N. W. 711; Burrs v. Richards, 152 Wl!J. 318, 140 N. W. 1. 
""See Ienlins v. SoufMrn Railway Co., 109 Ga. 35; BurlotJ v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 1; 
Ptr.rers v. Ru:rsell, 13 Pick (Mass.) 69; Bisard v. Sparks, 133 Mich. 587; Ligon v. Barton, 
88 Miss. 135; T::;ler v. HGJI, 106 Mo. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep. 338; Arwood v. Atwood, 
15 V.'ash. 285; Gaines v. Keener, 4S W. Va. 56; Burts v. Richards (Wis.). 140 N. ,V. 1 • 
.. Hill v. Krt:iger, 250 Ill. 408; Brick v. Garber, 261 Ill 378, 103 N. E. 1059; Collins 
v. Smith (Iowa), 122 N. W. 839; SnearTien v. Sneafhen, 104 Mo. 201; Williams v. 
Latham, 113 Mo. 165; Ball v. Foreman, 37 Ohio St. 132. 
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or, is to. be presumed to have been' delivered, sine~ it would not 
have been prepared in that form had it not been intended to op~~ 
before the grantor's death. Delivery is, as above indicated, the final 
expression, subsequent to the signing and sealing, of an intention 
that the instrument shall be legally operative, and whatever the fonn 
of the instrument, it cannot well constitute the basis for an inference 
that, subsequent to the signing and sealing, such intention was ex-
pressed.80 
It has furthermore been said that the grantor's retention of the 
instrument does not give rise to a presumption of non-delivery if 
he retains an interest in the property and it is consequently to his 
advantage that the instrument be preserved.31 It is however difficult 
to see that, in the ordinary case, it is to'his advantage that the instru-
ment be preserved, if its effect is to divest him of either the whole 
interest or a partial interest in the prQperty. He would in either 
case be better off if the instrument were no longer available for the 
purpose of asserting h{s grantee's rights thereunder. 
That the instrument is in the possession of the grantee named 
therein is usually referred to as raising a presumption that it has 
been delivered,82 based, it would seem, on the probability that the 
grantor gave him possession of the instrument, and the improbability 
that the grantor would vest him with such a mnniment of title unless 
he intended that the title should pass. 
In England and Massachusetts there are decisions to the effect 
that the signing and sealing of the instrument in the presence of an 
attesting witness raises a presumption of delivery,113 the effect of 
which presumption would be to justify a finding of delivery, although 
the instrument is still in the grantor's possession, upon evidence that 
it was signed and sealed by him. Such a presumption does riot ap-
pear to have been recognized elsewhere, and it may perhaps be re-
garded as based on a recognized practice, in the jurisdictions named, 
30 Sec Whitney v. Dewes, IO Idaho 633, 655, So Pac. III7, 69 L. R. A. 572; Colyer 
v. H~·den, 94 Ky. I8o. 
31 Blakemore v. Byrnsid2, 7 Ark. 504; Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. I94; Scnlglzam v. 
Wood, IS \Vend. 545. 
02 Gai11es v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322; Simmons v. Simmons, 78 Ala. 365; TJwmpso11 v. 
:McKenna (Cal. App.), I33 Pac. 5I2; Hill v. Merritt (Ga.), 91 S. E. 204; Inman v. 
Swearingen, I98 IIL 437; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 Ill. 92, IOI N. E. 227; Hild v. Hild, 
129 Iowa 649, II3 Am. St. Rep. 500; Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. .z37; Ball v. Sandlin, 
I76 Ky. 537, 195 S. W. 1089; Valentine v. Wheeler, n6 Mass. 478; Barras v. Barras 
<Mich.), 159 N. W. 147; Wilson v. Wilson, 85 Neb. 167; Pierson v. Fisher, 48 Ore. 223; 
Painter v. Campbell, 207 Pa. 189; Jackson v. Lamar (Wash.), 108 Pac. 946. 
""Hall v. Bainbridge,u 12 Q. B. 699; Hope v. Harman, 16 Q. B. 751, note; Burlin!! 
v. Paterson, 9 C. & P. 570; :Moore v. Ha::ellon, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102; Howe v. H01Ve, 
99 Mass. SS. 
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of making delivery of the instrument by a declaration to that effect 
in the presence of witnesses at the time of signing and sealing.M 
The propriety of such an inference of delivery from the mere fact 
of signing and sealing might indeed depend on the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, for instance on the presence or absence of 
the grantee. That the grantor signs and seals the instrument in the 
presence of the grantee may justify an inference of delivery, while 
his doing so in the grantee's absence may not.35 
That the attestation tjause, under which the witnesses write their 
names, recites the delivery of the instrument, has occasionally been 
regarded as creating a presumption -of- delivery,38 while a contrary 
view has also been expressed.37 Such a fact might properly, it 
would seem, be regarded as evidence sufficient to support a finding 
of delivery, but whether it should be regarded' as creating a pre-
sumption of delivery, in the sense of requiring a finding of delivery 
in the absence of countervailing evidence, appears questionable.38 
Upon the question whether the fact that an instrument is acknow-
ledged raises a presumption of delivery the cases ai:e few and unsat-
isfactory. That it does not has occasionally been' decided,39 but 
there are a greater number of decisions to an opposite effect.40 
'The fact that the instrument is acknowledged in the presence of the 
grantee might operate to create an inference in this regard which 
31 See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, p. 385; \Villiams, Real Prop. (18th ed.) 
149: Xenos v. lFicklram, L. R. 2 H. L. 296, 320 . 
.. Sec Shtlton's Case, Cro. Ely 7; Levister v. Hilliard, 57 N. C. 12. "If both parties 
be present, and the usual formalities of execution take place, and the contract is to all 
appearances consummated without any conditions or qualifications annexed, it is a com· 
plete and \•alid deed, notwithstanding it be left in the custody of the grantor." 4 Kent's 
Comm. 453, quoted and applied in Scrugliom V· Wood, 15 Wend (N. Y) 545; Wallace 
v. Berdell, 97 N. Y. 13 . 
.. Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 296; Evans v. Gres, 9 L. R. Id. 539; Clark v. 
Akers, 16 Kan. 166, (semble); Hall v. Sears, 210 Mass. 185; Diehl v. Einig, Gs Pa. 320; 
Currie v. Donald, 2 \Vash. (Va.) 58. 
:rt Rushin v. Sliield, II Ga. 636; Hill v. llfcNichol, So Me. 209; Fisher v. Hall, 41 
N. Y. 416. 
""That it may furnish evidence of delivery see Dennis v. Dennis, Il9 Mich. 380, 78 
N. \V. 333; Hill v- 1\ferritt (Ga.), 91 S. E. 204 (semble). 
""Braun v. Monroe, II Ky. Law Rep. 324; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Kille 
v. Ege, 79 Pa. 15. 
'°Boyd v. Slasb:JCk, 63 Cal. 493; New Haven Trust Co. v. Camp, 81 Conn. 539, 71 
At. 788; Baker v. Updike, 155 Ill. 54; Burton v. Eosd, 7 Kan. 17; Goi:in v. De Miranda, 
76 Hun (N. Y.) 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1019; Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N. C. 2t6, 233; 
H:u11p!1rey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 35. 
In Alexander v. De Kennel, 81 Ky. 345, it was decided that acknowledgement did 
not create a Pre!illmption of delivery for the reason that the concurrence of the grantee 
is necessarr. This however involves another question, that of the ncce>~ity of accept· 
ance. 
114 -- MICHIGAN LAW .RSYIBW 
an acknowledgment out of his presence would not create.u Soine 
weight might also be imputed to the language of the certificate of 
acknowledgment, an acknowledgment in express terms that the 
grantor delivered the instrument being perhaps entitled to more 
weight than an acknowledgment merely that .he executed it.4H~ 
The usage of the community as to the time and manner of making 
acknowledgments might also have a bearing in this regard.45 It 
would seem on the whole desirable that the courts refrain from the 
assertion of a presumption of delivery from acknowledgment. 
but rather leave it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances 
of the particular case show an intention on the part of the grantor 
that the instrument shall be legally operative.4 G In several cases it 
is in effect decided that a finding of delivery cannot be based on the 
fact of acknowledgment alone.47 
The question may arise· in. this connection of the effect of a sta-
tute, such as e.....:ists in a number of states, making an instrument, if 
duly acknowledged, admissible without further proof of execution. 
In one state such a statut~ has been regarded as ptacing on the op-
posite party the-burden of show~ng non-delivery'5 but this does not 
appear to accord with decisions in other jurisdictions that the authen-
tication of a document sufficient to render· it admissible in evidence 
does not necessarily create a presumption of its execution.~9 
That the grantor has the instrument recorded, or leaves it with 
the proper official for record, has been frequently referred to as 
raising a presumption of delivery.50 This amounts in effect to a 
41 See Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend (N. Y.) 545; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 
612; Adams v. Baker, 50 W. Va. 249, 40 S. E. 356 • 
.._..See Hawes v. Hawes, 177 Ill. 409; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Blight v. 
Schenck, 10 Pa. 2S5. • · 
""In Braun v. Monroe, tt Ky. Law Rep. 324, it is said that the acknowledgment 
raises a presumption of delivery because the instrument ought to be delivered before 
acknowledgment. This cannot well be said in all communities. 
44 That the acknowledgment is merely evidence bearing on the question appears to 
be recognized in Fergusen v. Bond, 39 W. ·va. 566; Hutchinson v. Rust, 2 Gratt (Va.)_ 
394· . 
• 1 Humphrey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 35; Wiggins v. Lusk, 
12 Ill. 132; Baker v. Updike, 155 Ill. 54; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 17; Gtn'in v. De M~ 
randa, 76 Hun 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1019 • 
.. Tucker v. Helgren, 102 Minn. 382. 
•• A11derson v. Cuthbert, 103 Ga. 767: Scott v. Delany, 87 IlL 146; Ross v. Gould, 
5 Me. 204; Siegfried v. Levan, 6 Sergt. R. 308; Bogle v. Sulli·::ant, l Call CVa.) 561. 
See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2135. . 
., Leans v. Watson, '9& Ala. 479, 39 Am. St. Rep. 82; Lee Hardware Co. v. Johnson 
(Ark.), 201 S. ,V. !!89; Ellis v. Clark, 39 Fla. 714; Creigl1ton v. Roe, 218 Ill. 619, :i:o9 
Am. St. Rep. 310; Blackc11sliip v. Hall, ;<33 Ill. n6; Colee v •. Colee, 122 Ind. 109; 
H11tto11 v. Smith, 88 Iowa !!38; Lay v. Las (Ky.), 66 S. W. 371; Holmes v. McDonald, 
n9 Mich. 563, 75, Am. St. Rep. 430; Griffin v. Hor:ey (Mich.), 146 N. W. :10; Inger· 
soll v. Odendahl, 136 l\linn. 428, 162 N. W. 525; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262; 
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statement that such action on the part of the grantor shows, prima 
facie, an intention on his part that the instrument shall be legally op-
erative. It is, in the ordinary case, difficult to see any object in leav-
ing the instrument for record, unless it is intended that it shall op-
erate as a conveyance, and the rule of presumption referred to ap-
pears to be founded in reason. In a few states only does this view 
appear to have been actually repudiated, and it is not always clear, 
in these states, why such an effect is denied to the grantor's conduct 
in this regard.51 In a very considerable number of cases it is said 
that the action of the grantor in having the instrument recorded does 
not show delivery if this was without the knowledge or consent of 
the grantee,52 but this introduces another question, that of the ne-
cessity of acceptance of a conveyance, which properly calls for sep-
arate discussion,53 and these cases cannot generally be regarded as 
involving a repudiation of the view that the action of the grantor 
in having the instrument recorded shows, printa facie, an intention 
that it shall take effect as a conveyance. The presumption of deliv-
ery, based on the action of the grantor in having the instrument re-
corded, is recognized as being subject to rebuttal by evidence that 
he did not intend the instrument to operate as a conveyance.H 
In several cases the fact that the purpose of the conveyance was 
Mitcl1ell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Robbins v. Roscoe, I2o N. C. 79r, 38 L. R. A. 
238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; Thompson v. Jones, x Head (Tenn.) 574; Davis v. Garrett, 
91 Tenn. I47; Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tex. 142; Bjmcrland v. Ely, IS Wash. IOI. 
01 See Egan v. Horrigan, 96 Me. 46. In McMan11s v. Com111ow, to N. D. 340, the 
decision to this effect is based on an ill-advised statute undertaking to state what con· 
stitutes delivery. In Massachusetts this position appears to be in part the result of the 
view (post at note 81) that there must be knowledge of or assent to the conveyance on 
the part of the grantee. (See Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Samson v. Thorn· 
tor., 3 Mete. 275), and in part of the notion that delivery of a deed means the physical 
transfer of the instrument. Hau•kes v. Pike, ro5 Mass. 560; 7 Am. St. Rep. 554; 
Barnes v. Barnes, I6r Mass. 38r. The legislature has now intervened by making the 
record of a eonve::(ance conclusive evidence of delivery in favor of a bona fide pur· 
chaser. See Rev. Laws, c. 127, § 5. 
""Yo11ng v. G11ilbean, 3 Wall (U. S.) 636; Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 \Vall 81; Kno:r: 
v. Clark (Col.), 62 Pac. 334; Sullivan v. Edd;:,', I54 Ill. 199; Wilcnon v. Handlon, 207 
ill. Io4; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; O'Cor.nor v. O'Connor, 100 Iowa 476; Ale:r:-
at1der v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345; Oxnard V• Blake, 45 Me. 602; Maynard v. Mayt1ard, 
xo Mass. 456, 6 Am. Dec. I46; Samson v. Thornton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 275, 37 Am. Dec. 
IJ5; Bullitt v. Taylor, 34 l\liss. 708, 69 Am. Dec. 412; Cravens \". Rossiter, u6 Mo. 338, 
38 Am. St. Rep. 606; Der,.y Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264; Jacksot1 v. Phipps, u 
Johns \N. Y.) 418; King v. At1trim Lumber Co. (Okla.), 172 P:ic. 958; Bogard v. 
Barham (Ore.), 108 Pac. 214-
"'_Post at note 8I et s~q. · 
"'Humiston v. Humiston, 66 Conn. 579; Jo11es "· B11sh, 4 Harr (Del.) 1; Ellis v. 
Clark, 39 Fla. 714; S11Tliva" v. Eddy, I54 Ill. 199: l'a11ghm1 v. Vaugflan, 94 Ind. I9; 
Hutton v. Smith, 88 Iowa 238; Hogadone v. Gra1111r M11t. Fire Ins. Co., 133 Mich. 339; 
Barras v. Barras (Mich.), 159 N. \V. 147; Babbitt "· Bc11t1ett, 68 Minn. 260; Metcalfe v. 
Brandon, 60 Miss. 685; Boardman v. Dana, J-1 l'a. 252; Tltompso" v. Jo11es, Head 
(Tenn.) 576; Walsli V. Vermont Mui. Fire Ins. Co., 54 Vt. 351. 
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merely to prevent the assertion or collection of a claim by a third 
person against the grantor and not to vest a beneficial interest in the 
grantee, has been regarded as precluding, or at least as tending to 
preclude, any inference of aelivery from the grantor's action in re-
cording the instrument.55 Such a view appears, however, to be open 
to question. The instrument cannot operate in any degree for his 
protection unless it operates as a conveyance, and the fact that he 
desires protection would seem to be rather an additional reason for 
regarding the instrument -as having become operative by delivery.58 
Even conceding that his purpose to avoid payment of claims would 
show that there was no delivery, it might be questioned whether he, 
or one claiming in his right, should be allowed to assert that the or-
dinary inference from his use of the recording system should not be 
drawn, because he made such use for purposes of deception. 
That the grantor, after having the instrument recorded,· himself 
obtains it from the recc:-<ling officer, instead of leaving it with the 
latter to be called for by the grantee, does not appear to have any 
proper bearing upon the question of the grantor's intention in having 
it recorded. 57 Even though there were the fullest intention on the 
part of the grantor that the instrument should become legally effec-
tiYe, he might well desire to have it returned to him to hold tempor-
arily. The fact however that the grantor not only obtains the instru-
ment after its record, but retains it in his possession, has been re-
garded as showing that it has not been delivered.58 Conceding that 
the record of the instrument by the grantor is sufficient in itself 
to make a prima facie showing of delivery, it is not entirely clear 
why his subsequent retention of the instrument should be regarded 
as showing a different intention. That the grantor has the instru-
ment recorded might properly, it is submitted, overcome any in-
ference of non-delivery from his subsequent possession of the in-
""Coulsnn v. Scott (Ala.), 52 So. 436; Union M .. t. Life I..s. Co. v. Campbell, 95 
lit. 267, 35 Am. Rep. 166; Weber v. Christe.I!, 121 IIL 98; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 
19; Dads v. Dai.;s, 92 Iowa 147; Egan v. Horrigan, 96 ?.'Ce. 46; Hogadonc v. Grange 
Jfot. Fire Ins Co., 133 Mich. 339; Hooper v. Vanstrom, 92 Minn. 406; Koppelmann v. 
Koppelmann, 94 Tex. 40, 57 S. W. 570; Elmore v. Marks, 39 VL 538. 
~ 5t!e Decker v. Stansbury, 249 Ill. 487; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 ?i.fo. ,:,62; Cor1c:r 
v. C<.>rlcy, 2 Cold (Tenn.) 520. 
01 ~ec Lewis v. Watson, 98 Ala. 480, 22 L. R. A. 297; Russcli v. May, 77 Ark. 8!); 
Moore v. Giles, 49 Conn. ;70; Allen v. Jfoglics, 106 Ga. 775; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 
109 ; Collins v. Smith (fowa), 122 N. W. 839; Las v. Lay (Ky.), 66 S. \V. 371: 11fitch· 
ell's Lesset! v. R:,.an, 3 Ohio St. 377; Tlwnrf'son v. Jones, t Head (Tenn.) 5;6. Bnt 
IVebcr v. Cliristen, 121 Ill. 98 is :lJl1':1n-ntly cc11tra • 
.. Weber v. Christel!, 121 Ill. 98; l111ttou v. Smith, 88. Iowa .238; Jourdain v. Paitu· 
S()n, I02 Mich. 602; Babbitt \« Ba"1•ilt, 68 Minn. 260; Elmore v. Marks, 39 VL 538; 
FoJirliavcn .Marbli: Co. \". Otuc11s, 69 Vt. 749. See Kitig v. Antrim Lumber Co. (Okla.). 
172 Pac. 958. 
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strument, since, as before remarked, it is difficult to conceive of any 
object in having it recorded other than that it should be legally op-
erative. 
It being conceded that a manual transfer of the instrument by the 
grantor directly to the recording offin-r shows, prima facie, an in-
tention that it shall operate as a conveyance, it would seem that his 
transfer of the instrument to another, to be by the latter handed to 
the recording officer, might likewise show such an intention, and 
there are decisions to that effect.Go 
It has been frequently asserted that the mere fact that the instru-
ment is of record raises a presumption of delivery, without any 
reference being made to the identity of .the person who had it re-
corded. 60 The cases do not ordinarily indicate the basis of this pre-
sumption, but occasionally61 it has been regarded as based, to some 
extent at least, upon the statutory provisions, existent in most of the 
states62 making an instrument, duly acknowledged or proved, and re-
corded, or a copy thereof, admissible without further proof. But 
this latter view does not appear to ac;cord with the authorities, before 
referred to,63 that the authentication of an instrument sufficient to 
justify its admission in evidence does not create a presumption of 
its due execution. A more satisfactory reason for inferring delivery 
from the fact that the instrument is of record would seem to be the 
probability that it was placed on record either by the grantor, this 
indicating an intention on his part to make it operative, 64 or by the 
grantee, this indicating that it was in his possession, which itself 
raises a presumption of delivery.65 Any presumption arising from 
the mere fact of record might be overthrown by evidence that the 
instrument was not placed on record by the authority of either the 
.. Tennesee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 125 Ala. 538; Zeigler v. Daniel 
(Ark.); l!l4 S. ,V. 246; Va/ta v. Blavka, I95 Ill. 6Io; 111 re Bell's Estate (Iowa), I30 
N. ,V. 798; Robbins v. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79, 39 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; 
Thompson v. Jones, I Head (Tenn.) 576; Bates v. Winters, 138 Wis. 673, 120 N. ,V. 498. 
""Estes v. German Nat· Bank, 62 Ark. 7; Parker v. Salmons, IOI Ga. I6o, 65 Am. 
St. Rep. 29I; Spencer v. Rayor, 25I Ill. 278; Witt v. Witt (Iowa), I56 N. ,V. 32I; 
Balin v. Osola (Kan.), 9I Pac. 57: Maynard v. Maynard, I45 Ky. 197; Patrick v. 
H=ard, 47 :Mich. 40; Sweetland v. Buell, I64 N. Y. 54I, 79 Am. St. Rep. 676; Stephen-
son v. Van Bloklatsd (Ore.), n8 Pac. I026; McDaniel v. Anderson, 19 S. C. 2n; 
Morgan v. Morgan, 82 Vt. 243; Wlziting v. Hoglund, I27 \Vis. I35; Laughlin v. Calumet 
& Chicago Canal & Dock Co., I3 C. C. A. I, Fed. 441. 
01 See Napier v. Elliott (Ala). 58 So. 435; Jackson v. Perkins, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 317; 
1.filcl1ell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Goodlett v. Goodman Coal & Coke Co., I92 
Fed. 775, u3 C. C. A. 6I. 
CThese statutes are summarized in 3 'Vigmore, Evidence, §§ 165I, 1676. 
03 Ante note 49. 
°'Ante note 50. 
es Ante note 32. 
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grantor or grantee,66 or __ by_other evidence to the effect that-there 
was no delivery.67 
That the parties to the instrument acted as if the title to the prop-
erty had passed to the grantee named has been regarded as showing, 
or tending to show, delivery.08 In regard to this it may be said that, 
while the fact that the grantor named acts as if the title had passed 
to the grantee named would appear to be strong evidence of his in-
tention that the instrument should operate to pass the title,69 that 
the grantee named so acts would appear to have little or no eviden-
tial value in this regard. 
It was said by Chancellor Kent, in a quite early New York case,70 
that a voluntary settlement is valid, even though the grantor retains 
possession of the instrument, in the absence of other circumstances 
to show that it is not intended to be absolute. In view of the fact, 
well recognized at the present day, if not at that time, that not only 
a voluntary settlement, but any conveyance, may be effective al-
though the physical possession of the instrument remains in the 
grantor,n the statement referred to with reference to voluntary set-
tlements appears to have no particular significance. It bas however 
been quoted from time·to time,72 and it appears to be responsible for 
the view, asserted in two or three states, that in the case of a volun-
tary settlement, especially when made in favor of an infant, the law 
will make stronger_presumptions in favor of delivery than in other 
cases.73 In one state it has even been said that in case of such a set- · 
tlement the burden of proof is on the grantor to show that there 
was no delivery.n Why there should be a relaxation of the require-
.. Bouvier Jaeger Coal Co. v. SJ,'f>her, 186 Fed. 6.w. 
"'Equitable J.forigage Co. v. Brown, 105 Ga. 475; HalluntJay v. Cook, 258 -Ill. !)!?, 
101 N. E • .227; .>,fcC11ne v. Goodwillie, zo4 Mo. 306. 
""Go11Td v. Day, 94 U. S. 405; Ir. re Jm:kscm Brid & Tile Co., 189 Fed. 636; 
Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104; Bruner v. Hart (Fla.), 51 So. 593: Rodemeil!r v. Braam, 
r69 111. 347; B11nneil v. B11nnell, III Ky. 566; Patrick v. HmDard, 47 Mich. 40 • 
.. See Cooley v. Cooley, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 520; D011.U.11e v. S"'"""~ (Cal.), 153 Pac.. 
;oS; T~cccdalc v. Barnett (Cal.), 156 Pac.. 483; Tupper v. Foulkes, 9 C.. B~ N. S. 797. 
10 Sowerbye v. Arden, 1 Johns, Ch. 240. • 
n Ante note 8. 
""See 1¥allace v. Berdcll, 97 N. Y. 13; Brya11 v. Wash, 7 DL 55;; r Perry, Trusts. 
§ 103 • 
.,. !>filler v. Meers, 155 UL .284; ~imer v. Latimer, 174 DL 418; A1'bott v • .Abbott, 
18!) 111. 488, 82 Am. St. Rep. 472; Baker v. "Hall, 214 DL 36". 73 N- E. 351; Cake 'V-
Colec, r22 Ind. 109; Cromder v. Searcy, 203 Mo. 97; ScluJoler v. Scboler, :58 Mo. 83, 
r67 S. W. 444- . 
"Bryan v. TVa::Ti, 7 Ill. 557; urintcrbottom ¥. Pa!lis:>11, 152 DL 334; .Al:Oott v. 
Abbott, i89 Ill. 488, 82 Am. St. Rep. 47z.. Bnt in Ha:ru ,._ Hir;res, i:;-7 DL 409, the _ 
necessity of a sho";ng of <lelivery even in the ca..<e of a volnnta.7 scttlemcr.t is clearly 
recoi:nized. 
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ments of proof of delivery in the case of such a settlement is not 
entirely clear. It has been said that "the same degree of formality 
is never required, on account of the great degree of confidence which 
the parties are presumed to have in each other, and the inability of 
the grantee, frequently, to take care of his own interests."75 As 
a matter of fact, however, no formality is necessary in any case for 
the delivery of a conveyance, and conceding the necessity of delivery, 
the reasons suggested for dispensing with the ordinary proof there-
of in this particular case appear somewhat inadequate. Indeed the 
fact that the settlement is voluntary,. a gift merely, might well be re-
garded as requiring the strictest proof of delivery.76 
Since an instrument of conveyance operates to transfer the title 
to the property only upon delivery, the ascertainment of the date of 
delivery is frequently a matter of importance. There is a ·rebuttable 
presumption that the day of delivery was the day on which it is 
dated,77 provided at least it is not acknowledged, or is not acknow-
ledged on a different date. When the date of the instrument differs 
from the date ·of acknowledgment, the delivery is by some courts 
presumed to have taken place on the former date,78 and by some on 
the latter.79 This difference of view as to whether the date of ac-
knowledgment controls, in the absence of other evidence, appears 
to be the result, to a very considerable extent at least, of a difference 
of view as to the probability of delivery before acknowledgment, 
and the usage of different communities in this regard might well 
differ. 
"Bryan v. Walsh, 7 Ill. 557. 
'"See Jamison v. Craven, 4 Del. Ch. 3II; Hooper \'. Vanstr11111, 92 Minn. 406. 
17 ff'illiams ""· Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389; Kimball V· Chicago, 253 111. IOS; Sweetser 
v. Lowell, 33 :!Ire. 446; Sclm1eigel v. Shakman Co., 78 Minn. 142; Blair State Bank v. 
B11n1Z, 61 Neb. 464; Grossen v. Oli1•cr, 37 Ore. 514; State \'. Da11a (\Vash.), 209 Pac. 
291; Do11t11at v. Roberts (\V. Va.), So S. E. 819; Wheeler v. Single, 6z \Vis. 380. 
"'Smith \'. Scarbrough, 61 Ark. 104; Smiley v. Fries. 104 Ill. 416; Lake Erie etc. 
R. Co. v. Wlii:lu:111, 255 Ill. 514, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 28 L. R. A. i>12; 1.fcC011nell v. 
Braum, 6 Litt CKy.) 459; Ford \'. Gregory, t<:> B. Mon. (Ky.) 1;-5; Snn.th v. Porter, 10 
Gray (Mass.) 66; Cc•11ley v. Fi1111, 171 Mass. 70, 68 A'11. St. Rep. 399; (But see Migliill 
\'. Town of Rowles, 224 Mass. 586, II3 N. E. 569); People v. Si:ydcr, 41 N. Y. 397; 
Harriman Lafld Co. v. Hilto:i, 121 Tenn. 308; Kirb;}' v. Cartwriglit (Te.". Civ. A:ip.), 
106 S. \V. 742; Beall v. Chatliarn (Te.'<. Civ. App.), 117 S. \V. 492; Harman , •• Obcr-
dorfcr, 33 Gratt (Va.) 497. In Calligan v. Calligan, 259 Ill. 52, 102 N. E. 247, it is 
decided that the deed is to be presumed to have hcen delivered on the day of its date, 
though not acknowledged till a later date, if the acknowledgment was not necessary to 
the passing of the title, and only then. 
"'Kitcher.er v. Jq/zlik, 85 Ka'!- 684; Loomis v. I'iull'"•'. 4~ >'.re. 299 (scmblc); Hen· 
derson Y. Baltimore, 8 ?\Id. 352 (semble); Fontaine v. B,-.,11m~11's Sai1. !nst., s; ?irio. 552; 
Blancliard ,._ T~·ler, 22 :Mich. 339, 86 Am. Dec. 57; .Ui//"r v. p.,tcr, 158 !\lich. 336; 
Barber Asplzalt Pa:;. Co • .-. Field, 174 Mo. App. H, 161 S. W. 364; Boln>ke~· v. Furey, 
12 Phila. (Pa.) 428 (semble); Kent v. Cecil (Tex. Civ. App.}, 25 S. W. 715. 
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ACCEP1'ANCE 
In many of the states, perhaps a majority, an acceptance of the_ 
conveyance by the grantee named therein has been regarded as es-
sential to its validity.80 And it has accordingly been decided in a 
number of cases that the conveyance is not effective as against the 
claim of a third person which accrued, by reason of attachment, 
recovery of a judgment, or purchase for value, between the time 
of delivery of the instrument and the grantee's subsequent assent 
thereto. SJ. • 
A conveyance was effective at common law altliough the trans-
feree did not assent thereto or even know thereof, he always having 
however the right to "disclaim,'' that is, to repudiate the conveyance 
and thereby revest the title in the grantor.s:: Such is the rule in 
England at the present day.83 And in spite of the constant asser-
tion and reassertion by the courts in this country of the necessity 
of acceptance, it is difficult to av:oid the conclusion that in a number 
of states the rule in this regard is the same as in England, that no 
acceptance of the conveyance is necessary, though the grantee may, 
if he choose, dissent and disclaim. That no acceptance is necessary 
appears to be involved in the statement, made with great frequency, 
""Russell , .• Mas, n ·Ark. 89, 90 S. \V. 617; Hibberd v. Smitla, 67 Cal. 547: s6 
Am. Rep. 726; K110.t· v. Clark (Colo. App.), 62 Pac. 334; Sta/lines v. Newton, 110 Ga. 
875; Hulick v. Scot:il, 9 Ill. r59; Abernatliie v. Ricla, 256 Ill 166, 99 N. E. 883; Wood· 
b11r.•• v. Ful:er, 20 Ind. 387, 83 Am. Dec. 325; K:sle v. Kyle (Iowa). 157 K. \V. 248; 
Ale.<:ancier v. De Kennel, 81 Ky. 345; Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, 153 S. \'i. 10; Ho1tlton 
v. Houlton, II9 :Md. 180, 86 At. 514; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217; l¥atso11 v. Hill-
man, 57 l\Iich. 607; Miller- v. McCa/cb, 208 Mo. 562; Re11nebaum v. Renncbaum, 78 N. J. 
Eq. 307, 79 At. ::75, 79 N. J. Eq. ·65;i, 83 At. n18; Ar11cgaard v. ArncgaarJ, 7 N. D. 
475, 75 N. \V. 79: •• 41 L. R. A. 258; Coucl: v. Addy, 35 Okla. 355, 129 Pac. 709: 
La'risey v. Larise.;,, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129 Reid \'. Gorman CS. D.), 158 N. \V. 780; 
Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. 12; Wclcli v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243; And see ante, note. 
K11/1 v. Garvin, 125 llfo. 563; Rogers v. Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. S-"· 3; L. R. A. 
433; Welcl> v. Sackett, 12 \Vis. 243. 
It has been said in this connection that while acceptance will ordinarily relate back 
to the time of delivery, it will not do so to the prejudice of third persons. Hil:bcrd v. 
Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 56 Am. Rep. 726. 
51 Partridge v. Chapman, 81 Ill 137; Woodbu1"3• v. Fisf:cr, 20 Ind. 387. ~3 Am. 
Dec. 325; (But see Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154); Day v. Griff.th, 15 Iowa u4; 
Bell v. Farmers' Bank <-f Kc,,tneks, n Bush (Ky.) 34, 21 Am. Rep. 205; Simpson ,,-. 
Yocm11, 172 Ky. 449, 189 S. \V. 439; Field v. Fisher, 65 :?.lich. 606; Kno:r ~·. Cl!JTk 
(Colo. Arp.), 62 Pac. 334; 1foa11s v. Coleman, 101 Ga. 152; :J.fcFa.dden v. RC"ss. 14 Ind. 
Ap1>. 112; Fisc!:cr Leaf c.,. "· 11'/iirpT.·. 51 .l\Io. A1>p. 181; DcrrJ.• Bai:k ,._ 1Fel>st"r, ¥. 
N. H. 264; Kemp11er·v. Ro.•n11f1al. 81 Te."'<. u; Parmeke v. Simpso'I, s \Vall (U. S.) SL 
Sec St-:J11e v. JVe-..JJ Enyla11d flux (',1., .:?'16 Mass. S, 102 N .. E. 9-19· 
••Litt. §§ C.84, 685; J1,,1r.-.- , .• Bak,•r's Case, 3 Co. Rep • .:?6c; Tlu•mf'son v. Leach, 2 
\'"1.-ut. 198; Sheppard's Tout h:,.to11e. 28-1-. See SkiJ-..i:it~s &'r .. , ... Ct1n11i11pl1a111~ S Leigh 
l \"a.) "i"· 
""Siggers v. Et·ans, 2 EL & Ill. 367; Standing v. Bo:c:ring, 31 Ch. D. 286; ]lfa'lktf 
v. II "ifs,,,. ( 1903), 2 Ch. 494- See article on the nature of disclaimer by F. E. Farrer, 
I·:,+. in 3:> Law Q11art. Rev. 83. 
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that, provided the conveyance can be regarded as beneficial in char-
acter, and as not involving any burden on the grantee, his accep-
tance will be presumed in the absence of any showing of dissent,64 
and this though he is in entire ignorance of the conveyance.s:> 
Such a statement represents a tendency, which appears to be open to 
criticism,86 to express rules of substantive law in the form of rules 
of presumption, a mode of expression which is particularly objec-
tionable when, as hi this case, the thing presumed to exist is a thing 
which concededly does not exist. If there is no acceptance, no rule 
of law, whether or not designated a presumption, can create an ac-
ceptance. And the only- conclusion, it is submitted, to be drawn 
from the decisions upholding a beneficial conveyance even in the 
absence of acceptance, is that acceptance is not necessary in the· 
case of such a conveyance. The adoption of the double fiction, 
that acceptance is necessary, and that it exists although confessedly 
it does not exist, 'has, it is conceived, no reason whatsoever of policy 
or convenience in its favor. 
The assertion of a presumption of acceptance, as it appears in the 
cases referred to, is objectionable, it is submitted, not only as involv-
ing the introduction of confusing and unnecessary fictions, but also 
because it in effect differentiates, as regards the necessity of ac-
ceptance, between conveyances which are and are not beneficial. 
Sine~ the grantee, so long as he has n.ot actually accepted the trans-
.. Arrington v. Arrington, I22 Ala. 5Io; Graham v. S11ddeth (Ark.), I33 S. W. I033; 
De Lcvillian '"·Edwards, 39 Cal. 120; Merrills v. Swift, I8 Conn. 257, 46 Am. Dec. JI5; 
:t.roore v. Giles, 49 Conn. 570; Baker v. Hall, 2I4 DI. 364, 73 N. E. 35I; Brem111erman 
v. Jennings, IOI Ind. 253; Emmons v. Harding, I62 Ind. I54, 70 N. E. I42; Podhajsk)~s 
Estate, I37 Iov..,. 745, II5 N. \V. 596; Gideon v. Gideon, 99 Kan. 334; Jefferson Count;y 
Buildir.g Ass'f& v. Heil, 8I Ky. 5I3; Houlton v. Houlton, II9 Md. I8o. 86 At. 5I4; 
Ingersoll v. Odenda1il, I36 Minn. 428, I62 N. W. 525; Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 685; 
Ensworth v. King, 50 Mo. 477; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Rcnnebaum v. Renne· 
baum, 78 N. J. Eq. 427, 79 At. 309; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406, 6 Am. Rep. 112; 
Tlffl Eyck v. Whitbeck, I56 N. Y. 341; Lynch v. Johnson, I7I N. C. 6u; 89 S. E. GI; 
Arnegaard v. Arnegaa>"d, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797; 4I L. R. A. 258; Slia/Jer v. 
Smith (Okla.), 156 Pac. u88, (voluntary deed); In re Braley's Estate (Vt.), 82 At. 5; 
Gtlggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457. In Ward v. Rittc11ho11sc Coal Co., I52 Ky. 
228, I53 S. W. 2I7, it is said that acceptance is not to be implied or presumed if the 
grantee is competent and is present in person. 
•Elsberry v. Bo~,'ki1', 65 Ala. 336; Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cranshaw (Ala.), 53 So. 
8I2; Rs1ssell v. Mas (Ark.), 90 S. W. 61n Tibballs v. Jacobs, SI Conn. 428; In ra 
B~lr.s Estate (Iowa), I33 S. W. 1033; Bure ... v Nicholson (Iowa), I37 N. W. 1066; 
Wllester v. Folin, 60 Kan. 334, 56 Pac. 490; Clark v. CresWell, n2 Md. 339; Roepke 
v. N11t.;ma,. (Neb.), I46 Mo. 939 (conditional delivery); Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. 
Eq. 56; E::erett v. Everett, 48 N. Y. 218; illuno:: v. Wilson, III N. Y. 295; Salt::siedcr 
v. S~der, 2I9 N. Y. 523, II4 N. E. 856 (conditional delivery); Robbins v. Roscoe, 
120 N. C. 79, 38 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; Mitchell's Lessee v. Rsan, 3 Ohio 
St. 377. 
"'See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 326, 335, 351; " Chamber-
layne, Evidence, §§ Io87, n45, n46, n6o et seq. 
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fer, can disclaim, and so exclude any possibility of prejudice to him 
by reason of the conveyance, it is not readily perceived why the 
courts should undertake to discriminate in this regard. VVhether 
the conveyance shall be eventually availed of by the grantee is a 
matter for him to decide, and it does not appear to be the province of 
the court to indulge in suppositions as to his probable action in this 
respect. If acceptance is otherwise not necessary, why should the 
non beneficial character of the conveyance render it necessary? If 
it is othenvise necessary, why should the beneficial character of the 
conveyance render it unnecessary? Such a distinction, based on_ the 
beneficial or onerous character of the conveyance, has been repud-
iated in England/'7 but has been applied in several cases in this coun-
try/~ with the effect of invalidating a conveyance not actually ac-
cepted, because not regarded by the court as beneficial in character, 
although, in these same jurisdictions, a "beneficial" conveyance 
"·ould have been upheld without any acceptance. If an actual assent 
or acceptance, it may be remarked, is to be r~garded as necessary 
whenever any burden or obligation is imposed on the grantee, it is 
somewhat difficult to understand the decisions, hereafter referred 
tosa which uphold the validity of a conveyance in trust, although the 
trustee has riot assented thereto. 
The view that assent or acceptance on the part of the grantee is 
necessary appears to have had its origin, for the most part, in the 
notion that a· conveyance is a contract, and that consequently there 
must be a meeting of minds.90 But a conveyance is not a contract,91 
and there is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a conveyance as ef-
fectiY~ to vest property in the grantee even before the latter has con-
sented to receive it. In the case of a devise, as well as in that of a 
" •· Al:::iost e'·ery conveyance, in truth, entails some charge or obligation which may 
be onerous in the way of covenant or liability; and we think it much safer that one 
ser~:al rule should prevail, than that the courts should be asked in each particnlar 
in>ta,,ce if the deed may not be considered onerous." Campbell, C. J. in Siggers v. 
E:ar..;, :; El. & Bl. 367. 
"' Occasionally a conveyance has been regarded as not beneficial because it wa.S made 
i:1 the performance of a contract of sale, which imposed an obligation for the purchase 
rnor.e~· upon the purchaser. Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 268; Boardman v. Dean, 
;;.; Pa. :z:;::i; Wood v • • liontpelier, (Vt.), 82 At. 671. And a mortgage or conveyance 
to se.:ure :several creditors bas been regarded as not beneficial for the reason that its 
a.:ceptaT!ce by any one of the creditors" might result in precluding l1is recovery of the 
wh.:-le oi hi$ claim. Jolinson v. Farley, 45 N. H. 505. A conveyance made to one 
me:eh· as a conduit of title bas been regarded as not beneficial for this purpose. Little 
\". Eaio11, z67 Ill. 263, 108 N. E. 7:z7. Compare Ferrell v. Childress. 1;2 Ky. t6o, 18g 
$. "". 1149. where a conveyance so made was regarded as properly accepted by the 
pe:5~r. benericially interested in its execution. 
"' Po;ot note 95. 
~-'See n· elcli v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243; Rogers Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. 521; 37 
L. R. A. 433. 
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transfer by operation of law, the ownership p~sses without refer-
ence to whether the transferee has consented to _take the property, 
and the same might well occur in the case of a voluntary transfer 
inter vivos, provided only the transferee has the privilege of subse-
quently refusing the transfer.92 In support of this view reference 
may be made to the case of conveyances to infants and persons non 
compos mentis, and to that of conveyances in trust, discussed in the 
two following paragraphs. 
In the case of a conveyance to an infant, or to a person non compos 
mentis the courts, even those which assert most positively t~e ne-. 
c~ssity, in the ordinary cas£:, of an actual acceptance, undertake to 
avoid the difficulty of requiring acceptance on the part of one in-
capable of giving it, by asserting that in such case the assent of the 
grantee will be conclusively presumed, provided at least the convey-
ance is beneficial in character.93 But, as before remarked, the con-
ceded lack of acceptance cannot well be supplied by a presumption 
that the grantee would, if Ire had an opportunity, accept the convey-
ance, and moreover, even supposing this could be done, the presumed 
acceptance, in the case of a conveyance to an infant, or to a person 
n01i compos mentis would be an acceptance by a person lacking in 
legal capacity, and therefore a nullity. 
In the case of a conveyance in trust, the legal title is usually re-
garded as vesting in the trustee 'vithout any acceptance by him, or 
even any knowledge on his part of the conveyance,94 this result 
01 Anson, Contracts (13th ed.) 3, 4; Pollock, Contracts, Appendix A; Hammon, Con· 
tracts, §§ 6, 7, note II; Clark, Contracts, II. 
Nor does a contract necessarily involve a meeting of the minds of the parties. "The 
contractual obligations which the common law recognized ;vere enforced, and ai:e -still 
enforced, not because those obligations are the result of agreement, but because certain-
forms of procedure afforded remedies for certain wrongs." Harriman, Contracts, (2nd 
ed.) § 6II. 
"'If a father should die testate, devising an estate to his daughter, and the latter 
should afterwards die without a_ knowledge of the will, it would hardly be contended 
that the devise became void for want of acceptance, and that the heirs of the devisee 
must lose the estate. Neither will it be denied that equitable estates are every day 
thrust upon people by deeds, or assignments, made in trust for their benefit, nor will 
it be said that such beneficiaries take nothing until they assent. Add to these the estates 
that are thrust upon people by the statute of descent, and we begin to estimate the 
value of the argument, that a man shall not be made a property holder against his will. 
Thurman, C. J. in Mitcliell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377. 
"'Staggers v. Wltite (Ark.), II S. W. 139; Turner v. Tumer (Cal.), 161 Pac. 980; 
Miller v. Meers, 155 Ill. 284; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; Tausel v. Smit1' (Ind. 
App.), 93 N. E. 548; Fitsgerald v. Toedt (Iowa), 120 N. \V. 465; Combs v. Ison, 168 
Ky. 728, 182 N. ,V. 953; Campbell v. Knli11, 45 Mich. 513, 40 Am. Rep. 479; Fenton v. 
Fenton (Mo.), 168 S. W. n52; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262; Bjmerland v. Eley, 
IS \Vasb. IOI. 
"'Adams v. Adams, 21 \Vall. 185; D1!11ol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321; 7 L. R. A. 439; 
Minot , .• TiltfJn, 64 N. H. 3zr; G11lick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. E'q. 401; M;srover v. Freucli, 
124 ~f!Cij/GAN LAJY BfiV~EW 
being not infrequently attained on the theory of a presumption of 
assent.us Even though he subsequently dissents, and refuses to ac-
cept, the conveyance does not become nugatory, but equity will ap-
point another trustee.0 a 'fhe equitable interest under a deed of trust 
likewise vests in the beneficiary named without any acceptance 
thereof by him, or even any knowledge by him of the trust.91 It is 
sometimes said, in this connection, that one is presumed to accept 
the benefit of a trust.98 
-The courts, in referring to the necessity of acceptance, do not 
always clearly indicate whether it is to be regarded as an element 
of delivery, or as something additional to, and separate from de-
livery. Perhaps they more frequently suggest the former view99 
;3 K. C. 609; Read v. Robi11son, 6 \Vatts & S. 329; First Ba11k v. Holmes, 85 Pa. 23x; 
Talbot v. Talbot (R. I.), 78 At. 535; Clo11d v. Calhoun, Io Rich Eq. (S. C.), 358; Fur-
man v. Fisher, 4 Cold (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 2xo; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare 67; 
An:es, Cases on -Trusts (;md ed.) 229. But statements are occasionally found to th' 
effect that no title vests in the trustee until he expressly or by implication accepts the 
trust. I Perry, Trusts, § 259. Armstrong v. Morrill, I4 \Vall (U. S.) I38; Oscle:J 
Sta:·e Co. v. Butler Comzt.\•, 1.21 :Mo. 6I4; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 28I, 86 N. E. 
139· 
""Kennedy v. iVire, So Ala. 165; De .. oe v. Dye, 123 Ind. 32I, 7 L. R. A. 439; 
Howry v. Gardner, 4I Ohio St.· 642; J.fcK-foney v. Rl1oads, 5 \Vatts (Pa.) 343; E:;rick 
v. Hetrick, I3 Pa. 488; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.) 67; Bowden v. Parrisli, 8G 
Va. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 873. 
""lr·.1ir.e v. D1mlza111, III U. S. 327; Smith v. Da•·is, 90 Cal. 25; Dailey v. New 
Ha:·e11, 60 Conn. 314; Bra.-wc/l v. Downs, II Fla. 62; French v_ Northern Tt·ust Co., 
~97 111. 30; Brandon v. Carter, II9 ?.lo. 572, 41 Am. St. Rep. 673; King v. Donelly, 5 
Paige (K. Y.) 46; Roseman v. Roseman, I27 K. C. 494; Talbot v. Talbot (R. I.), 78 
At. 535; Clond v. Calhoun, ro Rich Eq. (S. C.) 358. 
"'Brooks v. Marbury, II Wheat (U. S.) 78; Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. 
Farrady (Del. Ch.), S2 At. 24; Kocli v. Strenter, 232 Ill. 594; 83 N. E. 1072; Millwllam! 
v. H1halen, 89 :Md. 216; Boston v_. T11rner, 20I 1\fass. 190; .Mar~11ette v. W'ilkiliso11, u9 
Mich. 4q, 78 N. W. 474, 43 L. R. A. 840; Gulick ,._ Gr<lic-k, 39 N. J. Eq. 4ox; Martin 
v. Fm:k, i5 X. Y. IJ4, JI Am. Rep. 446; ,\[olo11cy v. Tilton, 22 N. Y. Misc. 682, 51 
N. Y. Supp. 682; Breedlove v. Stump, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257; Skipwitli's E:r'r v. Cun-
11i11gliam, 8 Leigh (Va.) 272; Flep11or v. He11s!cJ.• (Va.), !>3 S. E. 582; c;1111cctic11t River 
Sav. Ba11k v. Albee, 64 Vt. 57I. See l\fcEwe11 v. Bamberger, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 576. 
98 Bronson v. HcnrJ.', I40 Ind. 455; Emporia First Nat. Bank v. Ridenour, 46 Kan. 
;18, 26 Am. St. Rep. 167; H. B. Cartwriglzt & Bro. v. U11itcd State.• Ba11k & Tr11st Co. 
(N. M.), I67 Pac. 436; Stone v. King, 7 R. I. 358, 84 Am. Dec. 557; Cio11d v. Callioun, 
IO Rich Eq. (S. C) 358; Furman v. Fislier, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 557. 
"'Stallings v. Nc-.11to11, uo Ga. 875; Brc111111erman v. Jc11nings, 101 Ind. 253; O'Con-
11or v. O'Co1:11or, 100 Iowa 476; Bscrs v. s1,e11ecr, IOI IU. 429, 40 Am. Rep. 212; 
Meigs v. Derter, I72 Mass: 217; Miller v • .llcCalcb, 208 Mo. 562; Jacks<m v. Phipps, I2 
Johns 4I8; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406, 6 Am. Rep. u2; Sullivan v. Sullivan (Ky.), 
20I s. w. 24. 
OccasionaUy it has been said that delivery and acceptance must be simultaneous. 
Hulick v. Sco:il, 9 Ill. I59; Clmrcl: v. Gilman, 15 Wend (N. Y.) 656, 30 Am. Dec. 82. 
Contra: Regan v. Howe, I2I Mass. 424; IVcleh v. Sackett, 12 \Vis. 243; Sullivan v. 
S111li.-a1• (Ky.), .20I S. \V. 24. And see Sto11e v • • l\'cw Engla11d Bor Co., 216 Mass. 8, 
102 X. E. 949. 
DELIVERY AND 4CCEPT ANGE OF DEEDS 
and this they apparently do in effect when they state that the grant-
or's record of the instrument does not create any presumption of 
delivery without the knowledge or assent of the grantee.10(1 There 
would seem, however, to be some difficulties in the way of regard-
ing the grantor's indication of intention as constituting delivery 
only when accompanied or immediately followed by acceptance. 
Adopting such a view, the grantor would, after having indicated his 
intention that the conveyance should operate, have the right until 
acceptance to change his intention, and to dispose othenvise of the 
property, and yet the cases appear to regard his indication of inten-
. tion, in the case both of conditional101 and unconditional deliv-
ery,102 as putting the property entirely out of his control. It is more 
satisfactory, it is submitted, conceding that acceptance is necessary, 
to regard it as something outside of delivery, as, in effect, an indica-
tion of the grantor's attention.103 The contrary view, above referred 
to, is apparently to some extent the outcome of the mistaken tend-
ency to regard delivery as involving a manual transfer of the instru-
ment, such a transfer being ordinarily impossible without the assent 
of the person to whom the transfer is made. 
The acceptance may, it has been said, be given by another person 
acting on behalf of the grantee, such .acceptance being sufficient if 
afterwards ratified by the grantee.104 Such a statement is somewhat 
ambiguous. If it means that, provided an unauthorized person ac-. 
cepts on behalf of the grantee, title immediately vests in the latter, 
subject to an option on his part as to whether he will ratify the ac-
ceptance, this appears to be the equivalent of a statement that, 
although there is no valid acceptance, title immediately passes to · 
the grantee subject to an option in him subsequently to repudiate 
the trans£ er, this being the common law and present English rule. 
It may however mean that an unauthorized acceptance being invalid, 
title does not pass until the grantee, by indicating !lis adoption of 
the acceptance, in effect himself accepts the eonveyance, this in ef-
11" Ante, note 52. 
101 See 14 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 394-
112 Ante, note 25. 
100 Such a view is involved in the occasional statements that the acceptance may lie 
given by the grantee even after the grantor's death. Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, 153 
S. W. 10; Taylor v. Sanford. (Tex.), 193 S. W. 661; Burkey v. Burkey (Mo.), 175 S. W. 
623; Gulf Red Cedar Co. V· Cra11Shaw (Ala.), 53 So. 812. 
10&Mcigs ''·Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N. E. 75; Colle/• v. Adds, 35 Okla. 35~, 129· 
Pac. 709. 
In Blackwell v. Blackwell, 196 Mass. 186, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1070, it was de-
cided that there may be a valid acceptance by the grantor in behalf of the grantee, 
whose gene~ agent he was. The cases cited in support of the decision merely involved 
the principle that no manual transfer of the instrument is necessary. 
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feet recogmzmg the asserted American rule, that the grantee's 
acceptance is necessary. Whichever meaning is given to the state-
ment, it does not appear that the unauthorized acceptance has any 
legal significance, the grantee's ratification of such acceptance, so 
called, being merely his acceptance of the transfer, of which there 
had previously been no valid acceptance. -
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